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Abstract 
We investigate the effect of individual banks’ liquidity shocks during the recent financial crisis of 
2008/2009 on the innovation activities of their business customers. Individual banks’ liquidity 
shocks are identified by the degree of interbank market usage. We use a difference-in-differences 
approach to identify the effect of interbank reliance during the crisis on total innovation 
expenditures in comparison to the periods before. Our results imply that those firms which have a 
business relation to a bank with higher interbank market reliance reduce their innovation 
activities during the financial crisis to a higher degree than other firms.  
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1. Introduction 
It is well known that innovation activity is a major determinant of technological progress and of 
growth of an economy (Aghion and Howitt 2009; Grossman and Helpman 1994; Solow 1957). 
At least since Schumpeter (1911) it is also widely recognized that technological progress and 
economic growth is associated with the availability of financial resources, and this is not an easy 
relationship if external financing is considered. Asymmetric information problems like adverse 
selection and moral hazard cause external financing constraints (Hall 2002). These constraints 
seriously hamper innovation activities and, consequently, technological progress and growth (e.g. 
Hall 2002). 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in late 2008 marked the peak in tension on the financial 
markets during the financial crisis of 2008/2009. After the Lehman bankruptcy, interbank market 
conditions worsened drastically, with the volume traded on this market reduced and this in turn 
leading to lower bank lending to the corporate sector (e.g. Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010; Iyer et 
al. 2014). It has been shown that these lending constraints were transmitted to the real sector, and 
led to reduced corporate investments and employment (e.g. Campello et al. 2010; Chodorow-
Reich 2013; Cingano et al. 2016). In contrast to capital and employment effects, causal evidence 
on the interaction between the bank system and innovation at firm level during the financial crisis 
does not exist.1   
The purpose of the paper is to fill this gap by investigating the effects of the financial crisis on 
innovation activity. Our approach relies on the financial crisis as an unexpected, exogenous and 
drastic distortion of financial markets, which had serious consequences for the lending behavior 
of banks. We use the fact that the collapse of the interbank market led to lending reductions and 
in consequence to reductions in real outcomes like capital expenditures (e.g. Cingano et al. 2016). 
Thus, in order to facilitate identification of the consequences of the crisis, we utilize as a cross-
sectional dimension the interbank reliance of banks and then estimate the impact of this relative 
engagement on their corporate customers’ innovative activities within a difference-in-differences 
context. 
                                                            
1 To our knowledge there exists literature investigating the effect of specific firm characteristics on innovation 
activity in the financial crisis (e.g. Amore 2015; Archibugi et al. 2013a & 2013b; Campello et al. 2010; Filippetti and 
Archibugi 2011; Paunov 2012). 
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Our main data source is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), a survey of innovative firms 
conducted by the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW Mannheim, Germany). The 
MIP allows us to identify the main bank of each firm. This offers the opportunity to match the 
firm data on innovation with information on banks obtained from the Bankscope database 
compiled by Bureau van Dijk. Using this rich balance sheet data set, an informative indicator for 
every individual bank’s reliance on interbank market transactions before the crisis is computed. 
Next, the data on the refinancing structure of individual banks is matched with information on 
their corporate customers.  
Our difference-in-differences estimates imply that it is indeed more likely that innovation 
expenditures will be reduced during the crisis due to financing constraints if the firm’s bank relies 
heavily on the interbank market. Moreover, decomposition of total innovation expenditures 
shows that the effect is stronger on investments in innovation than for current innovation 
expenditures. We also test for the effect on R&D, with similar results. Next, we investigate the 
impact of the crisis on marketing expenditures as an activity largely unrelated to technical 
progress, much less connected with uncertainty than innovation and a regular firm activity. Here 
we find no effect of banks’ reliance on the interbank market.   
Our study is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss both the institutional and the 
theoretical background. Section 3 explains the relationship between the financial crisis and the 
real economy2. In the next section data, methodology and results for the test concerning financial 
constraints of banks and the relation to financing problems of innovative activities are presented 
and discussed. The fifth and last section comprises our conclusion.  
2. Related Literature  
2.1 External innovation financing 
It is generally acknowledged that R&D investment differs from investment in normal assets (Hall 
2002). This is rooted in the nature of R&D expenditures, which provide low collateral, are 
usually sunk and uncertain with respect to outcome and market success (Hall 2002). Among 
others, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) as well as Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011b) show that 
                                                            
2 Real economy comprises the part of the economy (e.g. firms) that has the objective of producing goods and services 
rather than financial services (e.g. banks). 
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internal means are more important for R&D investment than for ordinary investments. These and 
other studies (e.g. Bond et al. 2005; Brown et al. 2012; Harhoff 1998; Hottenrott and Peters 
2012) demonstrate that internal financing constraints have a negative effect on R&D spending.   
Originating in asymmetric information between investors and inventors, financing of R&D has 
aspects of Akerlof’s (1970) market for lemons and is characterized by high “lemon premia” (Hall 
and Lerner 2010). Likewise, it is more difficult to obtain external finance for R&D investments 
than for other investments (Hall and Lerner 2010). Using a credit rating index as proxy for access 
to external finance, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011a, 2011b) show that external financing 
matters for R&D expenditure.3 In addition, empirical studies like Freel (2007) and Mina et al. 
(2013) investigate the relationship between innovativeness and access to external finance.  They 
emphasize that accessing external financing is indeed more difficult for highly innovative firms. 
As stated above, essential for our empirical study is an indicator for individual bank liquidity 
shocks. Therefore, our work is related to the strand of literature which investigates in several 
different ways the importance of bank financing for firms’ innovative activity (e.g. Alessandrini 
et al. 2010; Amore et al. 2013; Ayyagari et al. 2011; Benfratello et al. 2008; Chava et al. 2013; 
Cornaggia et al. 2015; Hsu et al. 2014). Among these, Amore et al. (2013), Chava et al. (2013) 
and Cornaggia et al. (2015) show that banking deregulation in the U.S. had effects on the 
innovative activity of firms. Considering bank development in Italy, Benfratello et al. (2008) find 
a strong and robust effect on process innovation but a weaker one for product innovation. Finally, 
Alessandrini et al. (2010) show empirically that a bank system that is functionally more distant4 
from the local economy hampers innovation. These studies support the notion that external 
finance is of relevance for innovation. 
2.2 Innovation expenditures during economic downturns 
The empirical research on the issue of how firms adjust their innovation investments in economic 
downturns is ambiguous. There is evidence that R&D expenditures might be counter-cyclical 
without credit constraints (e.g. Aghion et al. 2012). Conversely, financing constraints, as 
explained above, lead to a pro-cyclical behavior of innovation activities (e.g. Barlevy 2007). In 
                                                            
3  Czarnitzki and Toole (2011) find no significant influence. 
4 “Functional distance is computed as the number of branches operating in a province j, each weighted by the 
logarithm of one plus the kilometric distance between the capital of that province and the capitals of provinces where 
parent banks are headquartered“ Alessandrini et al. (2010, 6). 
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addition, several studies (e.g. Aghion et al. 2012; López-García et al. 2013; Männasoo and 
Meriküll 2014; Ouyang 2011) take access to external finance into account. They find that a lack 
of access to external finance is a major reason for a pro-cyclical behavior of R&D investments if 
internal resources are scarce.  
Another example, highly related to our work, is Nanda and Nicholas (2014), who investigate the 
effect of bank distress during the great recession on innovation. They use the share of bank 
suspensions5 to total banks as a measure for county-level bank distress. Applying the indicator in 
a difference-in-differences context, their results imply that higher distress indeed leads to lower 
firm-level innovation. 
3. External innovation financing and the recent financial crisis 
 We use the effect of the financial crisis as a period of strong disruptions within the financial 
sector as well as severe problems of the real economy. In such periods spillovers from 
disturbances from the financial sector to the real economy are more easily identified than in 
“normal” times. Moreover, identifying to what extent individual banks are affected by the crisis 
and thus the addition of a cross-sectional differentiation between the suppliers of debts is 
particularly helpful for measuring the effects on innovation activity. Following the argumentation 
of Nanda and Nicholas (2014), this impact on innovation works directly if innovation activity is 
financed by bank loans. Or it has an indirect effect if the firm has in general a weak access to 
external funding and reallocates internal resources from innovation projects to other, more 
important activities.  
The German banking structure is based on the “Three-Pillar-Banking-System”. Thus, in 
principle, three kinds of banks can be distinguished: private, cooperative and publicly owned 
savings banks. Both the cooperative and the public savings banks concentrate on the regional 
markets where they are located and mostly abstain from investment in international assets.6 
Moreover their own financing is largely but not solely based on deposits. Deposits do usually not 
                                                            
5 According to Nanda and Nicholas (2014), suspended banks are different from failed banks because they “could 
subsequently re- open” (Nanda and Nicholas 2014, 278). 
6 Both pillars mentioned are two-tier systems themselves. Besides regional savings banks in the public banks pillar, 
Landesbanken serve as central institutions and are responsible for capital market transactions and refinancing at 
wholesale funding markets. The same holds for the cooperative bank pillar, where cooperative central banks also 
exist with functions similar to Landesbanken. 
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fluctuate much and during the financial crisis they remained fairly stable (e.g. Cornett et al. 
2011). Private banks pursue a quite different business model as they are engaged in international 
investment and source liquidity to a significant degree by other resources than core deposits.  
Following the description in Bräuning and Fecht (2016), there are two markets for bank liquidity 
in the Eurozone. First, the primary market, in which banks borrow money from the European 
Central Bank against collateral through open market operations (Bräuning and Fecht 2016). 
Second, the interbank market which plays a crucial role in the financial system by redistributing 
liquid assets among banks. Both banks with a surplus of liquid assets and those with a lack of 
liquidity use the interbank market to exchange financial resources by secured or unsecured 
lending. As argued in Bräuning and Fecht (2016), unsecured lending is preferred in normal times 
since there is no need for costly collateral and interest rates.  
Consequently, a shock in the banking system that affects the interbank market negatively leads to 
severe consequences with respect to liquidity provision and cost of funds. If there is no 
immediate possibility to compensate the deficit by other sources of financing, banks more likely 
use liquidity for internal purposes than for loan supply (e.g. Cornett et al. 2011). Strains on the 
interbank market are exemplified by the spread between the European interbank interest rate and 
the overnight risk-free swap rate. The difference between the 3-month Euro InterBank Offered 
Rate (EURIBOR) and the 3-month Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) rates are shown in 
Figure 1. The emerging tensions on the interbank market in mid-2007 are reflected in the rise of 
the EURIBOR-EONIA spread. The spread reached its height in October 2008, immediately after 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Thus, following the insolvency of the Lehman Brothers bank in 
September 2008, the interbank market almost dried up.  
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Figure 1: 3-Month EURIBOR-EONIA Spread. Source: German Federal Bank (own 
calculations) 
 
The result of distress on the interbank market in the recent financial crisis was liquidity hoarding 
and a loss in trust among banks (Acharya and Skeie 2011; Ashcraft et al. 2011; Acharya and 
Merrouche 2012). As a consequence of hoarding and a re-shifting of liquidity, banks reduced 
their loan supply or applied less favorable credit conditions (Ivashina and Sharfstein 2010; Kapan 
and Minoiu 2013; Iyer et al. 2014).  
This particular reduction in lending is also reported for Germany. Craig and von Peter (2014) 
show that lending volumes in the German interbank market indeed went down. This in turn led to 
reduced lending by banks engaged in refinancing by interbank loans (Bundesbank 2009; IMF 
2016). Additional evidence comes from Puri et al. (2011), who investigated the lending behavior 
of public savings banks that are related to an affected Landesbank7. They show that these types of 
banks reduced their lending following the crisis to a stronger degree than savings banks related to 
an unaffected Landesbank. 
Our identification strategy relies on the interbank involvement of a firm’s main bank. More 
severely affected banks have a higher degree of interbank market borrowing and will in turn 
reduce their lending supply more strongly. Innovative firms in particular will find it difficult to 
                                                            
7 We explain the role of Landesbanken and their situation during the crisis below. 
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obtain external finance if financial markets are under stress (Lee et al. 2015; North et al. 2013).8 
Firms might try to find substitutes like equity financing (Kahle and Stulz 2013), but this will with 
all likelihood be rather difficult during such a major turmoil on the financial markets.   
4. Test for changes of innovation expenditures 
4.1 Data and Methodology 
Our sample of 2187 non-financial firms9 ranges from 2005 to 2010. We are able to identify the 
individual banks with which firms have commercial relations.10 Information available on the 
individual firm level is matched with data on their banks with respect to interbank borrowing. All 
data on banks originates from the Bankscope database, which is compiled by Bureau van Dijk. 
All information on the firms is based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), which represents 
the German section of the European CIS Survey. This matching affords us the opportunity to 
identify the possible mechanism of how shocks incurred by banks were transmitted to their 
clients.11  
We use total innovation expenditures ‘Total innovation expenditures’ as outcome variable to 
investigate the effect of the degree of bank stress on corporate innovation activity. Total 
innovation expenditures are quite broadly defined and the MIP characterizes total innovation 
expenditures as expenditures for (internal) R&D, expenditures for acquisition of external 
knowledge (licenses, external R&D), expenditures for product design and production preparation 
related to innovation, expenditures for market tests and market introductions, retraining of 
personnel, additional investment and material for the purpose of innovation.  
Using this information we are able to decompose total innovation expenditures into investment 
for innovation projects ‘Investment for innovation projects’ and current innovation expenditures 
‘Current innovation expenditures’. Investment into innovation projects covers expenditures for 
                                                            
8 Among others Freel (2007) and Mina et al. (2013) show that innovators have problems in accessing external 
financing even in normal times. 
9 The firms in our sample belong to the manufacturing industry and knowledge-intensive services. Innovative 
activity of knowledge-intensive services and their contribution to economic growth was highlighted by Barras 
(1986). Moreover Barras (1986), Freel (2006), Gallouj and Weinstein (1997) as well as Tether (2005) further 
characterize innovation activity in the knowledge-intensive service industries. 
10 We do not consider firms which are switching their bank in the sample period. 
11 In the case of private banks, we used the balance sheet data for the whole bank if the firm was affiliate to a branch 
of the specific bank.  
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additional investment and tangible assets for the purpose of innovation. Current innovation costs 
cover the rest of the total innovation expenditures, for example expenses for personnel, material 
and external knowledge. Thus, investments in innovation projects are to some degree more 
tangible and flexible compared to current innovation costs. 
We calculate the value of current innovation costs as the difference between total innovation 
expenditures and investments in innovation projects. Please note that we use repeated cross-
sections, as unfortunately many firms do not participate in the survey on a regular basis.  As we 
have repeated cross-sections for multiple consecutive years available, we apply a variant of the 
difference-in-differences methodology. Our treatment is a continuous variable and therefore we 
use a modification of the standard model. Moreover, we use several pre- and post- treatment 
periods and apply difference-in-differences model, suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). 
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009, 531), our Tobit model for a lognormal dependent variable 
with a threshold ߛ is: 
ln	ሺݕ௜௧∗ ሻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߜܫܰܶܧܴܤܣܰܭ௜ ൅ ߬ܫܰܶܧܴܤܣܰܭ௜ ൈ ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ ൅ ߚ௠ܺ௠ ൅ ߚ௡ܺ௡ ൅ ߩ௜ ൅ ߶௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧, 
ߝ~ܰሺ0, ߪଶሻ  (1)
where ݕ௜௧∗  equals one of the above-mentioned expenditures and is the unobserved latent variable. 
The observed dependent variable is equal to: 
ln	ሺݕ௜௧ሻ ൌ ቊ
ln	ሺݕ݅ݐ∗ ሻ if ln ln	ሺݕ݅ݐ∗ ሻ ൐ ߛ
ߛ if ln ln	ሺݕ݅ݐ∗ ሻ ൑ ߛ (2)
The dependent variables are log-transformed following the suggestion of Cameron and Trivedi 
(2009, 532), as firms are possibly not innovative.12 To evaluate the banks’ involvement in the 
interbank market and their influence on the firms’ financing during the crisis, the following 
variable is computed: the ratio of interbank market borrowing to total assets (INTERBANK) in 
percent. The measure is based on data from 2006 to take account of banks’ pre-crisis reliance on 
interbank borrowing. It is quite likely that banks with a higher ratio of INTERBANK face greater 
problems in the crisis. We therefore expect a positive coefficient of INTERBANK.13 
                                                            
12 Non-innovative firms report a value of zero innovation expenditures. The transformation requires that censored 
values of our dependent variable are set to a value ߛ which is smaller or equal to the smallest uncensored value. In 
our case, ߛ is slightly lower than the smallest value. 
13 In 2009, the Dresdner Bank and Commerzbank merged. Since we do not want to create a selection problem by 
dropping those observations, we cope with their merger by using the mean (38.17492) of both banks’ 2006 interbank 
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Hence, we use a variant of the well-known difference-in-differences model by taking account of 
the treatment intensity. Similar empirical models have been applied by Acemoglu et al. (2004), 
Duchin et al. (2010) and Waldinger (2010). Basically, it is assumed that the effect of the 
treatment variable is stronger if the value of this variable increases. The similarity to the usual 
difference-in-differences model is that the treatment variable enters the equation twice: first 
unchanged and then interacted with the relevant treatment period, in our case the time of the 
crisis. Thus, the interaction variable INTERBANK ൈ POST takes the value of the INTERBANK 
measure if the year is 2008 and later, and is zero for all years before 2008. Its coefficient informs 
us about the impact of INTERBANK on the specific expenditures due to the crisis.  
ܺ௠ represents the vector of firm-specific regressors and  ߚ௠ the coefficients to be estimated. We 
use lagged values of employees divided by 1000 ‘Employees in thousands’ to capture the effect 
of firm size. In addition, we include the square to account for a non-linear relationship. Moreover, 
we control for possible age effects by including the variables ‘Age’ and ‘Age squared’. In 
addition, we add a dummy for location in eastern Germany ‘Located in eastern Germany’. To 
control for the effect of belonging to a group of firms, we include a dummy ‘Part of firm group’ 
which assumes unit value if the firm is part of a group and 0 if not.  
As an alternative to the availability of internal means we use the lagged value of rating ‘Firm 
rating’. A higher rating is associated with a higher probability of default by the firm. Clearly, in 
all likelihood access to external finance is limited in the case of a weak rating since banks 
interpret this as a negative signal. A weak (high value in our case) rating evaluation can also be 
interpreted as insufficient availability of internal means. This in turn will probably negatively 
affect innovation expenditures. In addition the lagged growth of sales volume ‘Sales growth’ is 
included. This variable is interpreted by Behr et al. (2013) as well as Carbo-Valverde et al. (2009) 
as a proxy variable for Tobin’s Q and therefore growth and investment opportunities.  
A set of one period-lagged bank controls as used before are covered in ܺ௡. These are bank size 
measured in the logarithm of bank assets and return on average assets. To control for industry-
specific differences, we include a set of industry dummies ߩ௜. In addition, a set of time dummies 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
values. The approach is appropriate since both banks are quite similar with respect to bank type, size and other 
balance sheet characteristics. In addition, in our sample, the interbank values for Dresdner bank (37.575087) and 
Commerzbank (38.774753) are close together.  
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߶௧ is included. ߝ௜ represents the random error. Descriptive statistics for our sample are given in 
table 1. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (N=4399). 
 Mean SD Median 
Dependent variables    
Total innovation expenditures in million 7.138 98.048 0.391 
Investments in innovation projects in million 2.118 36.872 0.078 
Current innovation expenditures in million 5.020 76.106 0.196 
Firm controls    
Employees in thousands 0.317 2.334 0.052 
Age 33.059 39.057 18.000 
Located in eastern Germany 0.349 0.477 0.000 
Part of firm group 0.458 0.498 0.000 
Sales growth 0.077 0.756 0.039 
Firm rating 218.436 47.421 216.000 
Bank balance sheet information  
INTERBANK*100 26.252 11.271 31.375 
Bank assets in billion 399.445 592.566 27.267 
Return on assets 0.123 0.478 0.170 
4.2 Baseline results 
We first consider homoscedastic regressions, and subsequently test for heteroscedasticity, as 
coefficient estimates may be inconsistent if the assumption of homoscedasticity is violated in 
Tobit models. Wald tests reject the assumption of homoscedasticity for all specifications. In order 
to estimate a heteroscedastic Tobit, the homoscedastic variance ߪ is replaced with 
ߪ௜ ൌ ߪexp	ሺܼ௜ᇱߙሻ in the likelihood function (Greene 2003). We consider groupwise multiplicative 
heteroscedasticity by using a set of three firm size dummies based on the number of employees as 
well as the above mentioned dummies for age and industries. Regression results are presented in 
table 2. 
Variables capturing the effects of size and group association show the expected signs and are 
highly significant. In addition, the proxy for the business conditions with respect to internal 
resources and access to external financing (RATING) is negative and highly significant. This 
indicates that firms with a weak rating (high value) have lower innovation expenditures than 
better rated firms. This could be rooted in the fact that they have less internal means available or 
face problems in accessing external capital due to their weak rating.  
In the context of our research question, the most important variable is the treatment variable 
multiplied by the crisis indicator INTERBANK ൈ POST. This variable is negative in each 
12 
   
regression and at least significant at the 5 percent level. This means that if firms are associated 
with a main bank which has a higher interbank market borrowing-to-assets ratio, they reduce 
their innovation expenditures of either type during the crisis (in comparison to observations with 
a lower interbank market borrowing-to-assets ratio). Thus, a firm with a main bank that has a one 
standard deviation higher interbank market value than another firm reduces the innovation 
expenditures by about 28% due to the crisis. 
The results of the alternative measurement clearly show that firms related to a bank which is 
more engaged in interbank market borrowing reduce innovation expenditure to a larger extent.14 
Moreover, the reduction in investments in innovation projects apparently determines the 
reduction in total innovation expenditures. 
  
                                                            
14 Robustness tests using the mean of the INTERBANK value of the years 2004 to 2006 for each bank leads to 
similar results. Results are available upon request. 
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Table 2: Results of the heteroscedastic Tobit model on determinants of total innovation 
expenditures, investments for innovation projects and current innovation costs. 
Dependent variable Log of Total innovation 
expenditures 
Log of Investments in 
innovation projects 
Log of Current 
innovation expenses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INTERBANK 0.033*** 0.012 0.025* 0.013 0.039*** 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) 
INTERBANK ൈ POST -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.032** -0.032** -0.024** -0.025** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) 
L.Employees  0.489*** 0.473*** 0.428*** 0.420*** 0.544*** 0.520*** 
in thousands (0.069) (0.069) (0.133) (0.133) (0.074) (0.072) 
L.Employees  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
in thousands squared (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age 0.010** 0.010** 0.009 0.009 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Age squared -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Located in  -0.001 -0.106 -0.404 -0.461* 0.250 0.090 
eastern Germany (0.159) (0.162) (0.263) (0.270) (0.206) (0.209) 
Part of firm group 1.253*** 1.210*** 1.205*** 1.182*** 1.593*** 1.522*** 
 (0.162) (0.162) (0.264) (0.264) (0.204) (0.203) 
L.Sales growth 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.392*** 0.390*** 0.196*** 0.192*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.128) (0.129) (0.055) (0.056) 
L.Firm rating -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
L.Log of bank assets  0.110***  0.061  0.163*** 
  (0.035)  (0.058)  (0.044) 
L.Return on assets  -0.005 0.025  -0.089
  (0.137)  (0.232)  (0.178) 
_cons 11.225*** 9.125*** 10.498*** 9.345*** 8.576*** 5.472*** 
 (0.944) (1.172) (1.524) (1.863) (1.469) (1.701) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log Likelihood -10632.383 -10622.655 -11740.719 -11739.788 -11043.265 -11030.457 
l. censored Obs. 669 669 1066 1066 935 935 
uncensored Obs. 3730 3730 3333 3333 3464 3464 
Obs. 4399 4399 4399 4399 4399 4399 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.  
Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
4.3 Endogeneity and Selectivity 
Up to now we implicitly assume that banks and firms match randomly. However, banks differ 
with respect to their business strategies, including risk characteristics, and this may imply 
specific matches with their corporate customers. Some banks may be prepared to bear risks 
connected with the financing of innovation projects as well as innovative firms in general, while 
others may not. If this conjecture were true, we have a selectivity problem, as the risk structure of 
banks is not independent of the risk structure of their corporate customers. 
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We use inverse probability weighting to tackle selectivity on observables on the part of the 
firms.15 If the selectivity hypothesis is true, we observe two firm types. One type chooses banks 
with openness to risk and the other type of firm is associated with banks that are less prepared to 
finance risky projects. The aim is to eliminate any observable differences between the two firm 
types. After re-weighting, the two samples of corporate customers should be equal with regard to 
their explanatory variables.    
Clearly, obtaining the propensity score is based on a dichotomy, but our main variable of interest 
INTERBANK is continuous. Our approach for solving this problem is to use the German 
structure of the “three-pillar banking system”. Thus, in principle, three kinds of banks can be 
distinguished: private, cooperative and publicly owned savings banks. Figure 2 shows the 
different INTERBANK ratios for banks sorted by group association. Private banks, 
Landesbanken and cooperative central banks are much more engaged in interbank borrowing. 
Many of them realized severe losses, to such an extent that public support was necessary in some 
cases to secure their survival. Thus, cooperative and savings banks were much less affected by 
the financial crisis than the private banks.16 Therefore we define our treatment group by the 
sample of private banks, Landesbanken and cooperative central banks, while the other 
observations (cooperative banks and savings banks) serve as controls.  
Figure 2: Mean INTERBANK values by bank type and treatment dummy. 
                                                            
15 Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) propose a similar method to combine regression and propensity score weighting. 
16 See Meriläinen (2016) for an investigation of bank type-specific lending reactions due to the financial crisis. Their 
findings show for a European sample of banks, including Germany, that savings and cooperative banks suffered less 
than private banks. 
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Based on this categorization we apply a Probit regression to determine the propensity score. The 
dependent variable is the relation to a bank of the treatment group (yes/no) in order to implement 
a match between treated firms and control observations. To take firm size into account we use 
three dummy variables ‘1-9 employees’, ’10-49 employees’ and ’50-99 employees’, which take 
unit values if a firm employs less than 9, between 10 and 49 or between 50 and 99 employees. 
The large firms form the reference group. In addition, we use similarly specified dummy 
variables ‘Age 0-15’ and ‘Age 16-30’ to control for firm age-specific effects. Further explanatory 
variables are ‘Located in eastern Germany’, ‘Part of a firm group’ and ‘Firm rating’. Moreover, 
we use as a measure for risky activities ‘mean innovation expenditures per employee’17 which is 
the pre-crisis mean value of innovation expenditures per employee aggregated at the 3-digit 
NACE Rev. 1 industry level.  
We re-estimate our results using inverse probability weights as proposed by Imbens and 
Wooldridge (2009). In Table A.1 of the Appendix, we present results of the Probit regression to 
compute the propensity score for each year. We calculate the inverse probability weight based on 
the obtained propensity score and apply it to each firm for the specific year. The tests on mean 
differences between the explanatory variables for our two samples using inverse probability 
weights are also presented in Table A.2 of the Appendix. Results of re-weighted regressions are 
given in Table 3.18 Again, the interaction of interest is negative and significant at least at the 10% 
level for total innovation expenditures, investments in innovation projects and current innovation 
costs. These results are similar to the earlier results presented in Table 3 and coincide with the 
overall results of the earlier Probit regressions. 
  
                                                            
17 Results are similar when using research and development expenses per employee or sales with products newly 
introduced to the market. However, these indicators reduce the number of observations.  
18 Missing pre-crisis industry level innovation expenditure information causes a small sample reduction. Moreover, 
sample size decreases due to the fact that we restrict our sample to observations in the region of common support.  
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Table 3: Results of the re-weighted estimation of the heteroscedastic Tobit model.  
Dependent variable Log of Total innovation 
expenditures 
Log of Investments in 
innovation projects 
Log of Current 
innovation expenses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INTERBANK 0.018** 0.012 0.007 0.015 0.026** 0.011 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.018) (0.011) (0.013) 
INTERBANK ൈ POST -0.019** -0.018** -0.034** -0.033** -0.022* -0.023* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.013) 
_cons 11.076*** 10.433*** 9.492*** 10.126*** 6.901*** 5.561*** 
 (0.953) (1.198) (2.028) (2.297) (1.779) (1.979) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank variables - Yes - Yes - Yes 
Log Likelihood -20768.113 -20765.818 -22920.768 -22919.949 -21631.268 -21625.907 
l. censored Obs. 663 663 1054 1054 926 926 
uncensored Obs. 3646 3646 3255 3255 3383 3383 
Obs. 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.  
Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
4.4 Pre-crisis trend 
Next we test whether there was a significant difference in investment behavior prior to the first 
crisis year, 2008. In Table 4, we show the results of a more flexible version of the difference-in-
differences estimator, proposed by Mora and Reggio (2015):  
ln	ሺݕ௜௧∗ ሻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߜܫܰܶܧܴܤܣܰܭ௜ ൅ ෍ ߬௧ ൈ ܫܰܶܧܴܤܣܰܭ௜
ଶ଴ଵ଴
௧ୀଶ଴଴଺
ൈ ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ ൅ ෍ ߶௧
ଶ଴ଵ଴
௧ୀଶ଴଴଺
ܻ݁ܽݎ௧ (3)
  ൅ߚ௠ܺ௠௜௧ ൅ ߚ௡ܺ௡௜௧ ൅ ߩ௜ ൅ ߝ௜
 
Thus, we interact our treatment variable INTERBANK with the full set of year dummies ܻ݁ܽݎ 
except for the dummy for 2005, which serves as our basis year. Following Mora and Reggio 
(2015), we evaluate the parallel trend assumption in each year and test our null on common pre-
treatment trends ܪ଴: ߬௧ ൌ 0		∀	ݐ ൑ 2007 simultaneously.19 The parallel trend assumption would 
be met if we do not reject ܪ଴ at the ten percent level.   
Results in Table 4, panel A reveal that the coefficients of the pre-crisis interactions are not 
significantly different from each other. Thus, the common trends assumption is met for each 
outcome. Results in Table 4, panel B show that the same holds for the re-weighted estimations. 
                                                            
19 See e.g. Hangoma et al. (2017) and Yamamura (2016) for a similar approach. 
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Table 4: Test for a common trend. 
Panel A: Test for the non-weighted sample: ࡴ૙: common pre-treatment trends 
Dependent variable Log of Total  
innovation expenditures 
Log of Investments in  
innovation projects 
Log of Current  
innovation expenses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
߯ሺଵሻଶ  0.106 0.189 0.119 0.109 0.608 0.826 
p-value 0.948 0.910 0.942 0.947 0.738 0.662 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank variables - Yes - Yes - Yes 
Log Likelihood -10632.159 -10622.356 -11740.488 -11739.494 -11042.863 -11029.981 
l. censored Obs. 669 669 1066 1066 935 935 
uncensored Obs. 3730 3730 3333 3333 3464 3464 
Obs. 4399 4399 4399 4399 4399 4399 
Panel B: Test for the weighted sample: ࡴ૙: common pre-treatment trends 
Dependent variable Log of Total  
innovation expenditures 
Log of Investments in  
innovation projects 
Log of Current  
innovation expenses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
߯ሺଵሻଶ  0.299 0.364 0.018 0.009 0.700 0.729 
p-value 0.861 0.834 0.991 0.995 0.705 0.695 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank variables - Yes - Yes - Yes 
Log Likelihood -20767.071 -20764.655 -22920.332 -22919.474 -21629.009 -21623.223 
l. censored Obs. 663 663 1054 1054 926 926 
uncensored Obs. 3646 3646 3255 3255 3383 3383 
Obs. 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 4309 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.  
Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
4.5 Test for the effect on other expenditures 
Next, we test whether other expenditures were reduced in a similar way. For this purpose we 
estimate a similar specification for R&D and for marketing expenditures20 separately. We find a 
reduction of R&D expenditures, but a weaker and insignificant effect on marketing expenses. 
Similarly, R&D marketing activities do not offer collateral, but apparently these expenditures are 
regarded as being indispensable during a crisis and are not particularly risky, while R&D is 
definitely risky and can be delayed. The results are presented in Table 5. 
                                                            
20 Data for marketing expenditures is available since 2006.  
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Table 5: Test for R&D expenditures and marketing expenses. 
Dependent variable Log of R&D  
Expenditures 
Log of Marketing  
Expenditures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERBANK 0.046*** 0.011 0.021*** 0.008 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.008) (0.009) 
INTERBANK ൈ POST -0.033** -0.033** -0.012 -0.010 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) 
_cons 12.942*** 9.372*** 11.983*** 10.596*** 
 (0.964) (1.530) (0.463) (0.693) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank variables - Yes - Yes 
Log Likelihood -10313.978 -10305.431 -6397.812 -6391.429 
l. censored Obs. 996 996 219 219 
uncensored Obs. 2979 2979 2717 2717 
Obs. 3975 3975 2936 2936 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.  
Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
5. Conclusion 
We provide evidence of the impact of a crisis-induced negative bank shock due to stress on the 
interbank market on the innovation activity of firms. For this purpose, we use data on firms 
provided by the Mannheim Innovation Panel with respect to information on innovation activity. 
We are able to identify the main bank of each firm as well as the whole bank portfolio of up to 
six banks. We exploit this information by combining the firm-level data with bank-specific 
balance sheet data from the Bankscope data set.   
The recent financial crisis was characterized by distress on the interbank market. Our 
identification strategy relies on the fact that banks use this kind of funding to varying extents. 
The breakdown of the interbank market offers the opportunity to identify a cross-sectional 
dimension and differences between banks in refinancing themselves, as empirical studies provide 
evidence that banks relying heavily on this type of funding reduced credit supply to corporate 
customers more sharply (Iyer et al. 2014; Cingano et al. 2016). Then the causal relation between 
the credit crunch due to the activities of the banks can be separated from individual firm effects.  
Our results indicate that the firms are indeed more likely to reduce innovation activities due to the 
tensions on financial markets if they are related to a bank that was more strongly affected by the 
interbank market distortions than other banks. Total innovation expenditures are analyzed within 
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a difference-in-differences framework. The general result is that the banks’ capacities for 
refinancing have an impact on the financing of their corporate customers’ innovation 
expenditures. The decomposition of total innovation expenditures shows that investments in 
innovation are affected to a greater extent than current innovation costs, which probably comprise 
intangible expense. Hence, according to these results, external finance has an impact on 
innovative activity. Additional tests using R&D expenditures as outcome variable lead to similar 
results. Analyzing marketing expenditures, the results imply that there is no significant impact on 
this kind of expenditure, which is unrelated to technological progress.  
The financial crisis offers an interesting opportunity to investigate the effect of a drastic shock to 
the banks, which was transmitted to firms in the form of reduced external financing. 
Summarizing, according to our empirical results both internal and external financing resources 
affect innovative activity, and an unfortunate event like the financial crisis not only has a short-
run effect on current profits, but exerts a negative impact on the growth of the economy by 
affecting innovative activity. 
Our results have implications for the policy debate on bank business activities, subsidization and 
regulation in general. Bank strategies affect the funding of loans. Recent regulatory developments 
of the Basle II and III accords aim at stabilizing banks by for example holding a certain amount 
of core capital. In addition, the German bank system kept the three-pillar structure and therefore a 
quite heterogeneous funding structure by core deposits and wholesale funding. Our results imply 
that it is necessary to implement policies for banks that guarantee a stable refinancing structure in 
a stress situation to secure the unconstrained credit supply to their corporate (and also private) 
customers.  
In addition, other studies like Brautzsch et al. (2015) and Hud and Hussinger (2015) underlined 
the importance of public subsidies for innovative firms in an economic downturn. Consequently, 
if other sources of financing are scarce, policy makers should aim at programs to promote 
innovation activity during economic downturns. 
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Appendix A: Tables 
Table A.1: Matching results to obtain the propensity score for the construction of the 
inverse probability weights. 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Dependent variable Treated 
bank 
Treated 
bank 
Treated 
bank 
Treated 
bank 
Treated 
bank 
Treated 
bank 
L.1-9 employees -0.658*** -0.456*** -0.530** -0.670*** -0.813*** -0.526*** 
 (0.246) (0.173) (0.216) (0.202) (0.252) (0.182) 
L.10-49 employees -0.739*** -0.435*** -0.726*** -0.556*** -0.661*** -0.636*** 
 (0.176) (0.130) (0.157) (0.139) (0.180) (0.128) 
L.50-99 employees -0.538*** -0.234* -0.420** -0.374** -0.484** -0.047 
 (0.180) (0.137) (0.163) (0.149) (0.190) (0.136) 
Age 0-15 0.093 -0.038 -0.110 0.100 0.060 0.107 
 (0.183) (0.129) (0.158) (0.142) (0.186) (0.134) 
Age 16-30 -0.267 -0.091 -0.151 0.019 0.024 -0.027 
 (0.189) (0.126) (0.153) (0.131) (0.166) (0.119)
Located in eastern  0.386** 0.674*** 0.725*** 0.718*** 0.686*** 0.654*** 
Germany (0.156) (0.106) (0.128) (0.112) (0.140) (0.103) 
Part of firm group 0.301** 0.511*** 0.383*** 0.381*** 0.525*** 0.430*** 
 (0.132) (0.101) (0.120) (0.106) (0.132) (0.098) 
L.Sales growth 0.034 0.090 -0.081 -0.285 -0.062 -0.012 
 (0.099) (0.083) (0.264) (0.226) (0.061) (0.165) 
L.Mean innovation  8.227** 5.772** 7.455** 6.626** 3.139 5.022* 
expenditures per employee (3.523) (2.495) (3.292) (2.835) (3.535) (2.705) 
L. Firm rating -0.003* -0.003*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.002 -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
_cons 0.627 0.389 -0.124 0.915*** 0.248 0.403 
 (0.382) (0.301) (0.353) (0.338) (0.381) (0.308) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ps. R-Square 0.130 0.114 0.128 0.144 0.140 0.117 
Log likelihood -321.204 -552.097 -386.942 -483.553 -314.804 -574.209 
Obs. 538 900 640 815 528 939 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 1% level. 
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Table A.2: Mean comparison after matching for the years 2005 to 2010. Means calculated 
using inverse probability weights. 
 
Mean 
Test on 
mean 
differences 
Year Variable Control Treated p-value 
2005 L.1-9 employees 0.088 0.084 0.863 
L.10-49 employees 0.348 0.356 0.871 
L.50-99 employees 0.176 0.172 0.924 
Age 0-15 0.537 0.537 0.988 
Age 16-30 0.155 0.153 0.947 
Located in eastern Germany 0.414 0.403 0.824 
Part of firm group 0.530 0.521 0.864 
L.Sales growth 0.098 0.086 0.738 
L.Mean innovation expenditures per employee 0.020 0.020 0.816 
L.Firm rating 215.336 215.110 0.962 
2006 L.1-9 employees 0.128 0.128 0.996 
L.10-49 employees 0.340 0.345 0.890 
L.50-99 employees 0.167 0.168 0.970 
Age 0-15 0.438 0.428 0.786 
Age 16-30 0.284 0.291 0.825 
Located in eastern Germany 0.361 0.351 0.785 
Part of firm group 0.484 0.476 0.837 
L.Sales growth 0.110 0.121 0.738 
L.Mean innovation expenditures per employee 0.022 0.022 0.967 
L.Firm rating 217.312 217.052 0.936 
2007 L.1-9 employees 0.099 0.103 0.862 
L.10-49 employees 0.364 0.370 0.901 
L.50-99 employees 0.172 0.175 0.928 
Age 0-15 0.352 0.356 0.940 
Age 16-30 0.336 0.339 0.928 
Located in eastern Germany 0.360 0.374 0.739 
Part of firm group 0.474 0.461 0.772 
L.Sales growth 0.116 0.123 0.750 
L.Mean innovation expenditures per employee 0.022 0.021 0.771 
L.Firm rating 216.167 217.165 0.799 
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Table A.2 continued 
 
Mean 
Test on 
mean 
differences 
Year Variable Control Treated p-value 
2008 L.1-9 employees 0.096 0.096 0.998 
L.10-49 employees 0.391 0.398 0.866 
L.50-99 employees 0.174 0.175 0.977 
Age 0-15 0.326 0.311 0.682 
Age 16-30 0.388 0.396 0.828 
Located in eastern Germany 0.330 0.319 0.788 
Part of firm group 0.439 0.428 0.782 
L.Sales growth 0.087 0.088 0.968 
L.Mean innovation expenditures per employee 0.020 0.020 0.776 
L.Firm rating 217.652 219.285 0.659 
2009 L.1-9 employees 0.109 0.108 0.967 
L.10-49 employees 0.405 0.412 0.882 
L.50-99 employees 0.158 0.158 0.994 
Age 0-15 0.278 0.277 0.977 
Age 16-30 0.416 0.416 0.991 
Located in eastern Germany 0.376 0.365 0.831 
Part of firm group 0.459 0.451 0.872 
L.Sales growth 0.113 0.086 0.688 
L.Mean innovation expenditures per employee 0.019 0.019 0.992 
L.Firm rating 218.945 218.930 0.998 
2010 L.1-9 employees 0.107 0.105 0.907 
L.10-49 employees 0.397 0.408 0.762 
L.50-99 employees 0.167 0.162 0.857 
Age 0-15 0.283 0.280 0.917 
Age 16-30 0.432 0.429 0.927 
Located in eastern Germany 0.341 0.330 0.754 
Part of firm group 0.421 0.413 0.826 
L.Sales growth -0.073 -0.074 0.970 
L.Mean innovation expenditures per employee 0.020 0.019 0.811 
L.Firm rating 220.296 220.276 0.995 
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